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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1992) as an 
Appeal from final Orders denying Plaintiff's Petition for 
Modification of a Decree of Divorce in the Third Judicial District 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
awarding attorney fees to Appellee when Appellee failed to put 
forth any evidence of the reasonableness of the amount of fees, 
the necessity of the number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness 
of the rate charged in light of the difficulty of the case and 
result accomplished, and the rates commonly charged in the 
community. This Court will reverse a trial court only if the 
appealing party can prove an abuse of discretion. Jones v. Jones, 
700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985). 
2. Whether the trial court's finding that Appellant and his 
present wife's income is between $68,000.00 and $75,000.00 per 
year is clearly erroneous when the uncontroverted evidence showed 
that Appellant and his wife, driving as a team, make fourteen 
cents per mile (not per driver), including per diem, and have a 
total annual income of approximately $58,000.00. This Court will 
reverse a factual finding if it is shown to be clearly erroneous 
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a). 
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3. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the 
parties contemplated that Appellee would seek employment at the 
time of divorce when Appellant presented evidence that Appellee 
claimed that she was physically unable to obtain employment and 
there was no provision in the Decree which set forth that Appellee 
would increase her income. This Court will reverse a factual 
finding if it is shown to be clearly erroneous under Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 52(a). 
4. Whether the trial court erred by not finding that a 
substantial and material change of circumstances had occurred when 
Appellant presented evidence of a substantial decrease in his 
income to less than $30f000.00 per yearf an increase in his road 
expenses, an increase in Appellee's income, a decrease in 
Appellee's needs based on contributions by her two sons, and 
Appellant's inability to pay the awarded amount. The reviewing 
court will reverse the trial court's findings if, when viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, the evidence 
is insufficient to support the findings or that the findings are 
clearly erroneous. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah 
App. 1989) (citing Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
5. Whether the trial court erred by including Appellant's 
present wife's income in the determination that Appellant has not 
had a material and substantial change in circumstances when 
Appellee failed to put forth any law which would support an 
inclusion of a spouse's income to determine alimony. If a trial 
2 
court makes a determination of law, the legal decision is reviewed 
under a correctness standard. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange 
(II), 860 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1993). 
6. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's 
motion for new trial pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
59(a)(6) on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the court's findings and that the evidence was 
insufficient to support an award of attorney fees when Appellant 
presented evidence that the trial court's findings of fact 
regarding Appellant's income were clearly erroneous, Appellant 
presented evidence that Appellee was no longer in need of alimony, 
and Appellant presented evidence and law which demonstrated that 
the award of attorney fees without carrying the evidentiary burden 
is clearly contrary to established Utah law. This Court can 
reverse a trial court's decision when viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the finding of the trial court, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the finding. Utah R. Civ. 
Pro*. 52(a). In considering a trial court's decision to deny a new 
trial, the reviewing court will only reverse if it finds an abuse 
of discretion. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 
804-05 (Utah 1991). See also, Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 
84, 90 (Utah App. 1989). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A Decree of Divorce was entered on December 31, 1989 
divorcing Varnell Dobson and Dorothy Lynene Larson Dobson (Rec. 
84-89)1. Varnell Dobson filed a Petition for Modification on 
October 5, 1993 (Rec. 110-15). A hearing on Appellant's Petition 
for Modification was held on October 5, 1994. (Rec. 180-81). The 
trial court entered an Order denying Appellant's Petition for 
modification of Decree of Divorce on October 20, 1994 (Rec. 184-
86). The trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law on October 20, 1994 which stated that the parties stipulated 
to the original divorcef Appellant had no material change of 
circumstances because he voluntarily left his past employment and 
he and his current wife have annual income of approximately 
$75,000.00 (Rec. 185). The court further found that the parties 
contemplated that Lynene Larson would have to seek employment 
subsequent to the divorce. (Rec. 185). The court awarded 
Appellee attorney fees of $850.00 (Rec. 186). 
Varnell Dobson moved for a new trial pursuant to Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a) on October 28, 1994 (Rec. 187-88). 
Appellant did not request oral argument (Rec. 187-88). Appellee 
requested a decision on Appellant's Motion for New Trial without 
oral argument (Rec. 211). Appellant filed a Notice to Submit for 
Decision on November 2, 1994 (Rec. 218), and a Second Request for 
1
 For ease of reference, citations to the Appellate Record are cited as 
"Rec", citations to the Transcript of the October 5, 1994 Modification 
hearing are cited as "Tr.", and citations to the Transcript of the January 30, 
1995 Oral Argument are cited as "2Tr.". 
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Decision on December 6, 1994 (Rec. 221). On December 20, 1994, 
the trial court set Appellant's Motion for New Trial for oral 
argument on January 30, 1995 (Rec. 223). Appellant filed a 
Supplemental Motion for New Hearing on January 16, 1995 pursuant 
to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(2) (Rec. 225). 
Appellant requested that his Rule 60(b) motion be heard at oral 
argument previously scheduled for January 30, 1995 (Rec. 234-35). 
After a hearing on January 30, 1995, Appellant's motion for 
new trial was denied by the trial court (Rec. 237). On March 1, 
1995, the trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law from the hearing on Appellant's Motion for New Trial finding 
that it was obvious to the court that Appellee would have to seek 
employment subsequent to the divorce, that Appellant and his 
current wife have annual income of between $68,000.00 and 
$75,000.00, that Appellant's current wife was only present as a 
driver based on Appellant's experience, that Appellant and his 
wife drive an average of 4,874 miles per week, 50 weeks per year, 
that Appellant's failure to elicit testimony from Appellee's 
counsel about attorney fees does not give rise to a claim for an 
improper award of fees, that Appellant's income of at least 
$35,000.00 per year and Appellee's income of less than $10,000.00 
per year does not justify a modification of the Decree, and that 
the court finds Appellee's requested fees to be reasonable (Rec. 
309-10). The trial court awarded Appellee further attorney fees 
of $350.00 (Rec. 311). 
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Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Third District 
Court on February 6, 1995 (Rec. 280). Appellant filed a Motion 
to Stay Judgment Pending appeal on February 3, 1995 (Rec. 283). 
Appellant filed a cost bond on appeal on February 23, 1995 (Rec. 
299). Appellant filed a supersedes bond on appeal on February 24, 
1995 (Rec. 301). Appellant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on 
March 15, 1995 (Rec. 327-29). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellant in this matter was Plaintiff below. 
2. A Decree of Divorce was entered in the above-entitled 
matter on or about December 31, 1990 (Rec. 84-88), pursuant to a 
stipulation which occurred prior to October 1, 1990 and was 
accepted by the court on October 3, 1989 (Rec. 68). At the time 
the parties entered into the stipulation for the divorce, Appellee 
was unemployed (Rec. 10). At the time of the stipulation, 
Appellant believed that Appellee would not be able to work because 
of poor health (Tr. 72-73). Subsequent to the signing of the 
stipulation, but prior to the entry of the Decree, Appellee began 
working as a cashier for O.P. Skaggs in Preston, Idaho (Rec. 178-
79). 
3. The Decree required Appellant to pay Appellee $300.00 
per month as and for permanent alimony, commencing October 20, 
1990 and continuing on the 20th of each month thereafter (Rec. 
85). The sum of $300.00 per month was agreed to by the parties 
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based upon Appellant's income at that time (Rec. 78). At the 
time of the Decree, Appellant had monthly gross income of 
$3,776.24, and monthly net income of $2,513.81 (Rec. 39-40). 
Appellant had monthly expenses of $2,513.81 (Rec. 42). At that 
time, Appellant owed $19,711.93 on his first mortgage, and 
$23,935.41 on his second mortgage (Rec. 40). At that same time, 
Appellant owed $11,593.11 in unsecured credit card debt exclusive 
of the obligation on his car (Rec. 40-41). Appellant owed 
$15,862.95 on his car (Rec. 41). Appellant was ordered to assume 
all debt of the parties (Rec. 87-88). 
4. The Decree awarded Appellee a house and property in 
Lewiston, Utah (Rec. 80). This property was awarded to Appellee 
free of any encumbrance, in that Appellant was ordered to pay the 
existing second mortgage which had been placed on the parties' 
home in Salt Lake (Rec. 80). Approximately $15,000.00 of the 
funds from the second mortgage had been used to purchase the 
Lewiston property (Rec. 44; Tr. 56)2. Appellee was awarded two 
vehicles, household items, some tools, and one-half of Appellant's 
retirement and profit sharing plan (Rec. 81-82). Appellee was 
not required to assume any debt (Rec. 87-88). 
5. On October 5, 1993, Appellant filed a Petition for 
Modification of the Decree to eliminate or reduce alimony to 
Appellee based on a substantial and material change of 
circumstances (Rec. 110-15). Appellant also alleged that 
2
 Citations to the Transcript of the October 5, 1994 Modification hearing are 
cited as "Tr." See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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Appellee had failed to turn over many items of property awarded to 
Appellant in the Decree (Rec. 115). Appellant's income had been 
reduced to $2,500.00 and his monthly expenses had increased to 
$3,411.51 (Rec. 119). 
6. A hearing on Appellant's Motion for Modification of 
Divorce Decree based upon a change of circumstances of the 
parties' respective financial conditions and earnings, was held on 
October 5, 1994 before Judge Kenneth Rigtrip (Rec. 180-81). 
7. Appellant presented evidence of a decline in his wages. 
Appellant testified that he and his current wife drive as a team 
for Pride Transportation, Inc. (Tr. 46) As a team driver, each 
driver is paid nine and one-half cents per mile while driving and 
four and one-half cents per mile for per diem, for a total of 
fourteen cents per mile driven (Tr. 46; 60). Appellant submitted 
evidence (exhibits 29 and 30) that based on his year-to-date 
earnings at the time of the hearing, he has income of 
approximately $2,500.00 per month (Tr. 64-65). Appellant 
testified to an increase in his monthly expenses by presenting 
summaries of Appellant's actual monthly expenses and evidence of 
debts of Appellant incurred both prior to and subsequent to the 
parties' divorce (Tr. 50-66). Appellant presented evidence that 
his monthly debt load had increased by showing a total of credit 
card obligations in the sum of $21,473.85 (Tr. 66; Rec. 152). 
Appellant presented evidence that the amount due on the credit 
line (the second mortgage) was currently $25,629.97 (Tr. 56). 
Plaintiff's exhibit 29 evidenced that Appellant's monthly expenses 
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total $2,401.10 (Tr. 64-65). Plaintiff's exhibit 30 evidenced 
that Appellant and his current spouse's monthly expenses total 
$4,453.99 (Tr. 65). 
8. Appellant testified that he left the employ of USPCI 
because the company was beginning to terminate employees as part 
of a reduction of force (Tr. 78), that USPCI had cut or reduced 
employee benefits (Tr. 47; 77), that the risks of driving 
hazardous waste were great (Tr. 47-48), and that he had the 
opportunity for other employment which would provide benefits 
(Tr. 77-78). 
9. Appellee submitted a financial declaration on May 25, 
1994, declaring her monthly expenses to be $921.80 (Rec. 146-
150). Appellee testified that her monthly expenses total $929.80 
(Tr. 29). Appellee testified that she earns $5.50 per hour at her 
current employment and works approximately 35 hours per week 
(Tr. 32; 33-34). Appellee testified that she has had her current 
employment since November, 1990 (Tr. 35). The trial court found 
that Appellee's monthly income is $865.00 (Tr. 143). Appellee 
testified that her two adult sons live with her in her home (Tr. 
9-10; 38), that she pays $100.00 per month as one-third of the 
home mortgage payment (Tr. 9), and that she pays only one-third 
of the utilities and other household expenses (Tr. 9;15). 
Appellee testified that her only debt is to her dentist (Tr. 37; 
Rec. 147). Appellee testified that both her adult sons who live 
with her have jobs and bring home income (Tr. 38). Appellee's 
younger son earns approximately $700.00 to $800.00 per month (Tr. 
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43) Appellee testified that the property she lives in is 
purchased jointly with her elder son (Tr. 8). She also testified 
that the Lewiston, Utah property she received in her divorce from 
Appellant is unencumbered and she transferred title to one or both 
of her sons (Tr. 26). Appellee testified that she was not able 
to pay her attorney fees of $850.00 incurred in this matter (Tr. 
34). 
10. Appellee testified that she pays $100.00 per month for 
her mortgage (Tr. 121-22), $18.36 per month for property taxes 
(Tr. 122-23), $7.50 per month for real property insurance (Tr. 
123), $150.00 per month for food and household supplies (Tr. 
124), $34.66 per month for utilities (Tr. 124), $10.00 per month 
for laundry (Tr. 124), $25.00 per month dental (Tr. 124-25), 
$34.00 per month insurance (Tr. 125), $50.00 per month 
entertainment (Tr. 125), $40.00 per month incidentals (Tr. 125), 
and $50.00 per month income tax (Tr. 125). Appellee testified 
that based on these figures, her actual monthly expenses are 
$545.52 (Tr. 126). 
11. At the close of testimony, counsel for Appellee 
proffered that his attorney fees incurred were $850.00 (Tr. 139-
40). After counsel's proffer, the trial court asked Appellant's 
counsel if he had questions for Appellee's counsel regarding fees 
(Tr. 140). Appellant's counsel stated that he would question 
Appellee's counsel if he were on the stand, but that it was not 
his burden to put Appellee's counsel on the stand (Tr. 140). 
Appellant's counsel stated that he did not believe fees were 
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necessary or that Appellee was entitled to an award of fees (Tr. 
140). Appellee's counsel did not submit evidence or testimony to 
support his request for fees. 
12. The court made a determination that Appellant 
voluntarily terminated his prior employment with USPCI, which 
provided Appellant with an annual income of $48,000.00. (Tr. 143). 
The court then determined that Appellant's current income along 
with the income of his present wife amounts to approximately 
$75,000.00 gross per year (Tr. 144-45), and that this amount 
exceeds Appellant's salary at the time the Decree was entered. 
The court found that Appellant's monthly expenses on the road are 
reimbursed by his employer as a non-taxed expense allowance of 
$375.00 per month (Tr. 145). 
13. The court found that the parties had contemplated that 
Appellee would have to seek employment at the time the prior 
Decree was entered (Tr. 143). 
14. Based upon the above evidentiary findings, the court 
denied Appellant's Petition finding that no material change of 
circumstances occurred and alimony would not be decreased or 
terminated (Tr. 145). 
15. The court also entered judgment against Appellant for 
Appellee's attorney fees of $850.00 (Tr. 145). 
16. On October 28, 1994, Appellant made a Motion for New 
Hearing pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59 alleging 
that the ruling was against the evidence and there had been an 
error in law (Rec. 187-88). Included in Appellant's Motion was 
11 
an argument that Appellee failed to meet her burden of proof to 
support an award of attorney fees (Rec. 199-200), and that the 
court's finding that Appellant and his current wife had annual 
income of $75,000.00 was clearly erroneous (Rec. 192-95). 
Appellant submitted an affidavit from Robert Oberg which set forth 
that truck drivers are governed by statutes of the United States 
which allow drivers to drive a maximum number of hours between 
time off duty, and a maximum number of hours during a week (Rec. 
202-03). Appellant submitted an affidavit of Dan DeGrazio which 
set forth that Appellant is paid only $.095 per mile along with 
$.045 per mile in per diem for a total of $.14 per mile (Rec. 
204-06), and that the $200.00 per trip advance is to be used for 
expenses related to Pride Transport's truck and is not for the 
driver's personal expenses (Rec. 205). 
17. Appellee responded to Appellant's Motion (Rec. 207-08), 
and both parties submitted for decision without requesting oral 
argument (Rec. 211-12; 218-19; 221-22). 
18. Oral argument was set by the court for January 30, 1995 
to hear Appellant's Motion for Rehearing (Rec. 223-24). 
Subsequent to the setting of oral argument, Appellant filed a Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(2) Motion for New Hearing 
based on newly discovered evidence that Appellee participated in a 
business with her son (Rec. 225-26). Because oral argument was 
already set by the court, Appellant requested that both Motions be 
heard at the same time (Rec. 234-36). 
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19. At oral argument, the trial court denied Appellant's 
Motion for a Rehearing but, without prior notice to Appellant that 
evidence would be taken, the court took testimony from Appellee's 
counsel regarding attorney fees (2Tr. 12-18)3. The court allowed 
Appellee's counsel to testify to both the original modification 
hearing and the oral argument (2Tr. 13). Appellee's counsel 
offered no exhibits to show the time he expended on the matter, 
that the time spent was reasonable, nor that the fee charged was 
reasonable to the standards in the community (2Tr. 13; 15), but 
did testify that he had spent the time on both matters and that 
his rate is $175.00 per hour (2Tr. 14). 
20. Without further evidence, the court modified his prior 
finding and found that Appellant's income, along with that of his 
present wife is at least between $68,000.00 and $75,000.00 (Rec. 
275; 309). The court found that Appellant's present wife was not 
hired as a team driver because of her experience but because she 
is married to Appellant (Rec. 275-76; 309). The court then found 
that more than half of the income of the couple can be attributed 
to Appellant (Rec. 276; 309). 
21. The court found that Appellant's counsel had ample 
opportunity to "grill" Appellee's counsel regarding fees (Rec. 
277). The court determined that $300.00 per month for alimony, 
given that it is tax deductible, is conservative and there was no 
basis for modification (Rec. 276-77). The court denied 
3
 Citations to the Transcript of the January 30, 1995 Oral Argument are cited 
as "2Tr." See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion and denied Appellant's Motion for 
New Hearing (Rec. 277; 311). The court then awarded additional 
attorney fees to Appellee in the amount of $350.00 for time spent 
defending Appellant's Motion for Rehearing (Rec. 277; 311). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
1. It is incumbent on the party requesting attorney fees to 
demonstrate the necessity of the number of hours dedicated to the 
matter, the reasonableness of the rate charged, the complexity of 
the case and the result accomplished, and the rates commonly 
charged for divorce actions in the community. Newmeyer v. 
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Utah 1987). (citing Beals v. 
Baals, 682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984); Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 
1384-85 (Utah 1980)); accord Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P.2d 27, 28 
(Utah 1984). 
2. A factual finding is clearly erroneous if a reviewing 
court will be firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
3. In order to support an award of alimony, the court must 
examine the receiving spouse's financial conditions and need, the 
receiving spouse's ability to earn adequate income and contribute 
to her own needs, and the providing spouse's ability to provide 
support. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). 
4. For a modification of a decree, there must be a showing 
of a substantial change of circumstances occurring since the entry 
of the decree which was not contemplated in the decree itself. 
14 
Moore v. Moore, 872 P.2d 1054, 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Dnrfee 
v. Purfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in awarding Appellee attorney fees in 
the sum of $850.00 for the modification hearing because Appellee 
failed to carry her burden to show that the rate charged was 
reasonable and that the hours spent were necessary. Appellee's 
failure to put on any evidence or testimony as to the necessity or 
reasonableness of the fees requires that the award of fees be 
stricken. The burden to prove the reasonableness and necessity of 
fees is on the party seeking the fees. Appellant does not have 
the burden to show that the fees requested are unreasonable if the 
party seeking fees has not shown that the fees are reasonable. 
The trial court erred by awarding fees to Appellee at oral 
argument on Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial. Appellant set forth 
that the court had erred by awarding fees at the modification 
hearing because Appellee had failed to carry her burden of proof. 
At oral argument, the trial court apparently agreed with Appellant 
because the court swore in Appellee's counsel and had him testify 
as to both the modification hearing and oral argument. The trial 
court then awarded fees to Appellee. The award was in error 
because Appellant's motion was correct and the award of fees 
against Appellant was an abuse of discretion. Appellee again 
failed to carry her burden to support an award of fees at oral 
argument. Counsel testified as to the time he spent, but 
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submitted no evidence to support his testimony although he 
testified that he keeps written records. Appellee did not testify 
as to her ability to pay fees. 
The finding that Appellant and his current wife have annual 
income of $75,000.00 is clearly erroneous. Evidence submitted by 
Appellant establishesf and it is undisputed, that Appellant is 
paid $.14 per mile driven which includes a $.045 per diem. 
Appellant and his current wife drive as a team, and each is paid 
$.14 per mile when driving. Appellant's income is the amount of 
miles he drives multiplied by $.14. The trial court's conclusion 
that Appellant and his current spouse earn $75,000.00 per year is 
clearly erroneous in that Appellant and his spouse would be 
required to drive more than 60 miles per hour, 24 hours per day, 7 
days per week, 52 weeks per year to earn $75,000.00. 
The trial court erred by adding the expense reimbursement 
column to Appellant's gross income but failing to deduct the 
advances. At the beginning of each trip, Appellant is advanced 
$200.00 to cover expenses involving the truck. At the end of the 
trip, Appellant submits receipts for funds actually expended. The 
advance is then deducted from his check. The trial court erred by 
concluding that the $200.00 was an advance to cover Appellant's 
personal expenses while on the road. 
The trial court erred when it modified its previous findings 
at oral argument without granting Appellant's motion for new 
trial. The trial court modified its previous findings, but made 
no evidentiary findings to support the modification. The court 
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again erred in its new findings that Appellant and his current 
wife have income of between $68,000.00 and $75,000.00 per year. 
The trial court erred by finding that the parties 
contemplated that Appellee would seek employment at the time of 
the divorce. The Decree does not state that the parties 
contemplated that Appellee would increase her earnings. There was 
no evidence presented to the trial court that the parties actually 
contemplated that she would seek further employment, and Appellant 
testified that it was his understanding at that time that Appellee 
would not be able to work because of health problems. The 
increase is not contemplated within the Decree and it was error 
for the court to so find. 
The increase in Appellee's income from almost nothing to 
$865.00 per month constitutes a material change of circumstances 
and it was error for the court to fail to make an analysis of the 
factors requiring alimony. The trial court's failure to consider 
the substantial and material change of circumstances was clearly 
erroneous and requires reversal. 
The trial court failed to consider the factors supporting an 
award of alimony of determining the need of the receiving spouse, 
the ability of the paying spouse to pay, and the ability of the 
receiving spouse to provide for her own needs. The trial court 
erred by not finding that Appellant no longer has the ability to 
pay alimony, that Appellee no longer has the need for alimony, and 
Appellee is able to support herself. Based on those factors, it 
was error for the trial court to fail to modify the Decree. 
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Finally, it was error for the trial court to consider 
Appellant's spouse's income in the determination of Appellant's 
ability to pay. Appellant's spouse does not have a legal 
obligation to pay alimony to the Appellee. The trial court took 
into account the income of Appellant's wifef but failed to take 
into consideration her expenses. Appellant and his wife do not 
have the ability to pay alimony to Appellee. The trial court 
erred by considering the income but not the total expenses. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES WITHOUT TESTIMONY OR EVIDENCE IS 
CLEARLY CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED UTAH LAN 
A. Appellee failed to present any evidence to support an award 
of attorney fees 
This Court should strike the trial court's award of attorney 
fees to Appellee because the granting of attorney fees absent any 
evidence or testimony is clearly against established law. 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987). It is incumbent 
on the party requesting attorney fees to demonstrate the necessity 
of the number of hours dedicated to the matter, the reasonableness 
of the rate charged, the complexity of the case and the result 
accomplished, and the rates commonly charged for divorce actions 
in the community. Id. at 1279 (citing Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d at 
864; Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980)); accord 
Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P.2d 27, 28 (Utah 1984). Factors to be 
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considered for the reasonableness of fees include the time and 
labor required, the novelty of the issue, the skill required, the 
likelihood that the lawyer will not be able to accept other 
employment, the fee customarily charged in the locality, the 
amount involved, the result obtained, the time limitation imposed 
by the client, the nature and length of the professional 
relationship, and the experience of the lawyer. Code of Judicial 
Administration, Rule 1.5(a)(l)-(8). Appellee presented no 
evidence or testimony to support an award of attorney fees and as 
such, the award should be stricken. 
This Court can reverse an award of attorney fees and costs 
when either financial need or reasonableness has not been shown. 
Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Miinns 
v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Appellee failed 
to show the reasonableness of the awarded fees. At the close of 
testimony, Appellee's counsel proffered that his fees totaled 
$850.00 and that was his request. Appellee presented no evidence 
of the reasonableness of his rate, the necessity of the number of 
hours, or in fact even the actual number of hours expended, nor 
the rates commonly charged in the community. Appellee's counsel 
did not testify. There was no offer of any proof as to the award 
of fees. In Newmeyer, the Utah Supreme Court held that unless the 
party seeking attorney fees carries her burden to establish the 
proper evidentiary basis for the award, it is clear error to award 
fees. Id. at 1280. Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court in 
Delatore, 680 P.2d at 28-29, set forth that an award of fees 
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without evidence or testimony would be stricken. Appellee failed 
to establish that the fees were reasonable in light of the time 
spent and the necessity thereof. Appellee did not present any 
testimony or evidence as to the necessity of the fees or the 
reasonableness thereof. See Newmeyer, 745 P. 2d at 1279. 
Thereforef because Appellee failed to carry her burden to support 
an award of fees, the award of attorney fees to Appellee was 
clearly an abuse of discretion and should be stricken. 
Appellant does not have the burden to show that Appellee's 
requested fees are unreasonable and the trial court's imposition 
of that burden is clearly error. Appellee's counsel proffered his 
fees. The court asked Appellant's counsel if he had any 
questions. Appellant's counsel stated that if Appellee's counsel 
were on the stand, he would cross examine him. Appellee's counsel 
did not take the stand. Appellee has set forth that Appellant's 
failure to show that the fees were unreasonable by not calling 
Appellee's counsel to the stand carries Appellee's burden. The 
Utah Supreme Court set forth that the party opposing fees does not 
have the burden at trial to challenge the award when no evidence 
was presented on the subject. Delatore , 680 P. 2d at 29. 
Appellant did not have the burden to show that the requested fees 
were unreasonable because Appellee did not present any evidence 
that the fees were reasonable. The trial court's imposition of 
the burden onto Appellant was clearly error and cannot be used to 
support the award of fees. 
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B. There is no factual basis to support an award of additional 
attorney fees and those fees are not reasonable 
1. Appellant's Motion for New Hearing was legally and 
factually correct 
This Court should reverse the award of additional fees 
because there was no factual basis upon which a fee award could be 
made. At oral argument on Appellant's Motion for New Hearing, the 
court awarded additional fees to Appellee of $350.00. Appellant's 
Motion for Rehearing was based, inter alia, on Appellee's failure 
to carry her burden of proof for attorney fees at the modification 
hearing. Appellant submitted his Motion for Rehearing for 
decision without oral argument. Appellee submitted her opposition 
to Appellant's Motion without oral argument. The trial court 
scheduled oral argument. At the hearing on Appellant's Motion for 
Rehearing, the Court allowed Appellee's counsel to testify to the 
reasonableness of his fees in an improper and futile attempt to 
correct any error in the previously awarded attorney fees. 
Appellant's counsel was given an opportunity to cross-examine 
Appellee's counsel, but had no information provided upon which an 
effective cross-examination could be conducted. Appellee's 
counsel offered no exhibits to support his testimony and testified 
that he had brought no records to support his testimony. The 
court upheld its previous award of attorney fees then awarded an 
additional $350.00 in fees for Appellee's defense of the matter. 
The previously awarded fees were awarded against the proof offered 
by Appellee. Appellant complained of this lack of proof. The 
21 
trial court acknowledged the error by forcing evidence at a 
scheduled oral argument to rectify its error. The trial court 
then awarded additional fees against Appellant for having brought 
the error to the court's attention. Because Appellant's Motion 
was factually and legally accurate—Appellee failed to carry her 
burden of proof in the first hearing—the award of additional fees 
is improper. 
2. Appellee failed to carry her burden as to reasonableness 
and necessity of the awarded fees 
This Court should reverse the trial court's award of attorney 
fees to Appellee at oral argument on Appellant's Motion for New 
Trial because Appellee again failed to carry her burden to show 
the reasonableness or necessity of the award of fees. A decision 
to award fees must be based on evidence of financial need and 
reasonableness. Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). Appellee's counsel again proffered that he had expended 
time and Appellee incurred fees of $350.00. Without notice to 
Appellant, the trial court asked Appellee's counsel to take the 
stand where he testified that he had spent time on the matter and 
the same was reasonable. Appellee's counsel did not bring any 
time records, or other documents showing that he had actually 
spent the time or that the same was reasonable. Appellee's 
counsel testified that he did not research any case law and that 
he had only spent a short amount of time drafting his response 
(2Tr. 16-17). Appellee's counsel proffered, while on the stand, 
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that his client would testify that she is unable to pay the fees 
(2Tr. 15). Prior to any oral argument, Appellee had requested 
$350.00 for fees in her six paragraph Reply to Appellant's Motion 
for New Hearing (Rec. 207). Appellee's counsel's testimony is 
inadequate to establish that the fees requested are reasonable. 
Appellee's counsel testified that the time he expended was in 
consultation with his client, and drafting a six paragraph 
pleading. (2Tr. 14). There was no evidence that Appellee had a 
financial necessity for the award of fees, and Appellee's 
counsel's proffer on the stand is insufficient to support such an 
award. Appellee submitted no evidence to support the award as to 
reasonableness or necessity, and therefore the award of additional 
fees should be stricken. 
II. THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT'S INCOME IS IN EXCESS OF 
$75,000.00 PER YEAR IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
A. Appellant earns $.14 per mile driven for total income of 
between $29,000.00 and $30,000,00 per year 
The determination that Appellant has income of more than 
$75,000.00 per year is clearly erroneous. Appellant submitted his 
paycheck stubs and a summary of his gross yearly income. 
Appellant's Exhibit 22, which was created directly from 
Appellant's paycheck stubs, shows that Appellant has gross income 
from February 11, 1994 through September 30, 1994 of $16,292.58. 
On this same exhibit, April Dobson, Appellant's current wife, 
shows a gross income for the period February 11, 1994 through 
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September 30, 1994 of $17,833.70. The court clearly erred by 
concluding that Appellant and his current wife had a combined 
yearly income in excess of $75,000.00. The evidence is undisputed 
that Appellant is paid $.14 per mile, including his per diem. 
This amount is paid only to the person actually driving. The 
trial court set forth that an average week of driving would be 
approximately 4700 miles and that Appellant and his current wife 
drive only 50 weeks per year. Multiplying 4700 miles by 50 weeks 
by $.14 yields an annual income of $32,900.00. But Appellant 
testified that 4700 miles per week is too high and testified that 
an average week would be less than 4500 miles, yielding annual 
income of approximately $30,000.00. This amount is consistent 
with the evidence presented by Appellant that his monthly gross 
income is approximately $2,500.00. In order for Appellant and his 
current wife to earn $75,000.00 per year, they would have to drive 
more than 60 miles per hour, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, 52 
weeks per year. 
B. The trial court erred by adding expense reimbursement and 
advances to Appellant's total income 
Appellant testified that Appellant's Exhibit 21, his paycheck 
stub dated September 29, 1994, in the year-to-date column, showed 
a total gross income of $13,565.10. From that gross income, taxes 
of $3,283.77 were deducted. Advances of $5,693.60 were then 
deducted. Appellant testified that prior to each trip, he is 
given an advance of $200.00 by Pride Transport in order to cover 
costs of repair or items required for the truck. Upon returning 
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back to Pride, Appellant is required to submit receipts for costs 
expended on Pride's truck. Pride then deducts the $200.00 advance 
from Appellant's pay, less the amount supported by receipts 
presented for costs actually spent. Appellant testified that the 
company gives him $200.00, and when he returns from the trip if he 
gives the company $150.00 in expense receipts, for funds spent on 
the truck, $50.00 is deducted from his pay (Tr. 94). Appellant 
testified that the expense reimbursement in the year-to-date 
column included the reimbursement for repairs on the truck (other 
reimbursement) and the per diem which, Appellant testified, is 
$.045 per mile. Appellant testified, that in order to read the 
stub correctly, the expense reimbursement column should be added 
in but the advances column should be subtracted (Tr. 94). In 
Appellant's Motion for New Hearing, Appellant presented the 
Affidavit of Dan DeGrazio which set forth the correct reading of 
the pay stub. Within this affidavit, it was set forth that the 
advances are only to be used by the driver to pay for repairs to 
the truck (Rec. 204-06). This Affidavit also set forth that no 
personal expenses of the driver are reimbursed by the company and 
that each driver is only paid $.14 per mile including per diem. 
Appellant testified that his gross earnings from Pride for the 
period February 11, 1994 through September 30, 1994 were 
$16,292.58, and that amount was listed on Appellant's Exhibit 22. 
The court erred by adding the gross income to the expense 
reimbursement, without deducting the advances, then adding the per 
diem and other reimbursement again. By double counting what is 
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listed on one part of the pay stub and already included in the 
year-to-date column, the court's conclusion was clearly erroneous. 
The court also erroneously held that Appellant's road expenses, 
such as food and incidentals, are reimbursed by Appellant's 
employer. Appellant testified that no road expenses were 
reimbursed. Appellant testified that if he were required to 
replace a tire or do other repairs on the truck owned by his 
employer, those expenses are reimbursed and are accounted for in 
the other reimbursement category. There was no evidence 
whatsoever that any road expenses such as food and incidentals are 
reimbursed by Appellant's employer. It was clearly erroneous for 
the trial court to consider that personal expenses were reimbursed 
by the company. 
C. The court erred when it modified its findings 
The trial court erred in modifying its previous findings at 
oral argument and concluding that Appellant and his current wife 
have annual income of between $68,000.00 and $75,000.00. As set 
forth above, based on a high average of miles driven, Appellant 
and his wife have an annual income of approximately $60,000.00. 
The trial court, at oral argument, made the change in his 
conclusion, based on Appellant's Motion for New Hearing, of 
Appellant's salary, but made no findings as to the information on 
which he based the change. The court's modified findings that 
Appellant and his wife have an annual income of between $68,000.00 
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and $75,000.00 is clearly erroneous and does not have any factual 
support, nor did the trial court make any further findings on 
which the modified conclusion regarding Appellant's income could 
be based. 
D. This case should be remanded for a proper evidentiary finding 
This Court should remand this matter to the trial court 
because the finding that Appellant's income exceeds $75,000.00 per 
year is clearly erroneous, and as such, the evidence is 
insufficient to justify the judgment. A factual finding is 
clearly erroneous if a reviewing court will be firmly convinced 
that a mistake has been made. State v. walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987). The erroneous factual finding, along with the errors 
in law, require this matter be remanded. 
III. THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PARTIES CONTEMPLATED THAT 
APPELLEE WOULD SEEK EMPLOYMENT WAS CLEARLY AGAINST THE EVIDENCE 
A. There is no provision within the Decree anticipating 
Appellee's increase in income 
The court erred by finding that the parties contemplated at 
the time of divorce that Appellee would have to seek employment to 
provide for herself. The Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law 
upon which the original Decree of Divorce was based, did not state 
that the parties contemplated that Appellee would seek employment. 
"The fact that the parties may have anticipated an increase of 
income in their own minds or in their discussions does not mean 
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that the decree itself contemplates the change." Purfee v. 
Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Appellant 
testified that at the time of the divorce, Appellee was 
unemployed, and unable to work because of physical limitations 
(Tr. 72-73). In the October 5, 1994 hearing, Appellee presented 
no evidence that the parties contemplated she would work. In 
fact, Appellee began working after the stipulation was entered 
into, but prior to the entry of the decree of divorce in December, 
1990 without informing Appellant or the court. 
"In order for a material change in circumstances to be 
contemplated in a divorce decree there must be evidence, 
preferably in the form of a provision within the decree itself, 
that the trial court anticipated the specific change." Purfee, 
796 P.2d at 716. The Decree awarded Appellee two cars and a piece 
of property with a house in Lewiston, Utah free of debt. Appellee 
did not take any of the parties' debt. Appellee was also awarded 
$300.00 per month alimony. There is no indication that the 
parties based their agreement on the idea that Appellee would 
work, and no provision in the Decree which stated that any 
consideration was given to Appellee's future income. The sole 
provision regarding income is that of Appellant's income. 
Therefore, the Decree reflect that the parties contemplated that 
Appellee would increase her earnings. 
The court's finding that the parties contemplated Appellee 
would work is clearly erroneous, especially in light of the fact 
that no such provision exists in the Decree. The trial court 
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based his conclusion that Appellee would have to seek work on his 
memory of the original case and that it was based upon a 
stipulation (Tr. 141). The court then stated that "it was clear 
at that time and indisputable and was within the contemplation of 
the parties that Ms. Larson was going to have to go back to work" 
(Tr. 143). However, there was no such provision in the Decree and 
no finding of fact that such employment would occur. Based on the 
silence of the Decree, it must be concluded that such employment 
was not contemplated within the Decree and therefore is a material 
change of circumstances not contemplated within the Decree. See 
Dnrfee, 796 P.2d at 716. 
B Appellee's substantial increase in income is a material 
change of circumstances 
Appellee's increase in income from almost nothing at the time 
of the divorce to $865.00 per month, almost $300.00 per month more 
than her stated needs, constitutes a material change of 
circumstances sufficient to modify the Decree. In Purfee, the 
Utah Court of Appeals held that if the decree at issue does not 
have a provision expressly anticipating an increase in a party's 
income, and no evidence is presented to the trial court that such 
an increase was actually anticipated, the increase is not a 
material change of circumstances contemplated in the original 
decree. 796 P.2d at 716. Because the increase in Appellee's 
income is not contemplated in the original decree, the court must 
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examine the relevant factors in the award of alimony to determine 
whether alimony is warranted. 
The trial court failed to make a determination of the 
propriety of alimony in this case because it erroneously concluded 
that Appellee's increase in income was contemplated at the time of 
the Decree. The trial court erroneously failed to consider the 
material increase of Appellee's income within the factors of need 
and ability based on the court's erroneous conclusion that 
Appellee's increased income was contemplated at the time of the 
Decree. Therefore, this Court should remand this matter to the 
trial court with instructions to consider that Appellee's increase 
in her income is a material change of circumstances not 
contemplated at the time of the Decree. The trial court should 
then be instructed to consider the factors required to support an 
award of alimony to determine whether Appellant is entitled to a 
modification. 
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IV. THE COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE PROPER LEGAL TEST TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER APPELLEE SHOULD CONTINUE TO RECEIVE ALIMONY 
A. The trial court failed to consider the proper factors used to 
determine alimony 
1. Modification of alimony must consider the need of the 
receiving spouse and the ability of the paying spouse to 
pay 
The trial court's determination that a substantial change in 
circumstances to warrant a modification of alimony had not 
occurred was clearly erroneous based upon existing law. In order 
to modify an award of alimony, the moving party must show a 
substantial change in circumstances, not contemplated at the time 
of divorce. Moore v. Mooref 872 P.2d 1054, 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). In order to support an award of alimony, the court must 
examine the receiving spouse's financial conditions and need, the 
receiving spouse's ability to earn adequate income and contribute 
to her own needs, and the providing spouse's ability to provide 
support. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). These 
factors should also be examined in order to obtain a modification 
of a divorce decree, when a substantial change of circumstances 
has occurred. Moore, 872 P.2d at 1055. 
2. Appellant no longer has the ability to pay alimony 
Appellant does not have the ability to pay alimony because 
his income is substantially reduced, and his expenses have 
increased. Appellant presented evidence that his income is 
substantially reduced from the time the parties divorced. 
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Appellant's evidence showed that he has debt which requires 
monthly service and that a portion of the debt is marital debt 
from his marriage to Appellee, including the mortgage on the 
property Appellee was awarded unencumbered. Appellant presented 
evidence that he has more than $21,000.00 in credit card debt 
which requires monthly service. 
Evidence of voluntarily incurred debt can be grounds for 
modification of alimony if "they were incurred in a good faith 
attempt to meet alimony obligations or to maintain a decent 
standard of living." Auerbach v. Auerbach, 571 P.2d 1349, 1350 
(Utah 1977). Appellant presented evidence that at the time of the 
Decree, Appellant was required to pay more than $11,000.00 in 
credit card debt from the parties' marriage along with two 
mortgages on his home. Since the divorce, Appellant has increased 
his debt load in an almost equal proportion to the amount he is 
required to pay in alimony. Appellant presented evidence that he 
is further in debt on the second mortgage by approximately 
$1,500.00 and on credit card debt by approximately $10,000.00. 
During the time from the Decree until the modification hearing, 
Appellant has paid Appellee more than $18,000.00 in alimony. The 
evidence of the increased debt is consistent with the amount 
Appellant is required to pay Appellee and should be considered as 
to his ability to continue to pay. Appellant's Exhibit 29 showed 
that after monthly expenses, but prior to deducting the $300.00 
alimony to Appellee, Appellant has a negative cash flow of more 
than $300.00. The trial court erred by not finding that 
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Appellant's debt increase is consistent with Appellant's negative 
cash flow. 
Appellant presented evidence that his expenses on the road 
have increased since the time of the decree. Appellant stated 
that his monthly road expenses are approximately $475.00. This 
amount covers food and other incidentals while traveling on the 
road. The trial court questioned Appellant about expenses and 
suggested that Appellant take a cooler with apples, oranges, and 
bologna (Tr. 106). Appellant testified that the cooler would not 
be practicable because the ice would melt in approximately four 
hours, and that federal regulations require the driver to stop 
approximately every five hours and take a break (Tr. 106-08). 
The trial court rejected the consideration of the expenses on the 
road and erroneously concluded that Appellant should take a cooler 
on his truck, and "start stopping at McDonald's and Wendy's and 
fixing your own snacks" (Tr. 145). The trial court's 
determination that Appellant's road expenses had not increased or 
they were avoidable is clearly erroneous. The trial court erred 
by not finding that Appellant's expenses had increased since the 
time of the Decree. 
The trial court erred by not concluding that based on 
Appellant's increase in debt, consistent with his negative cash 
flow caused by paying alimony, his increase in expenses, and his 
decrease in income, Appellant no longer has the ability to pay 
alimony. 
33 
3. Appellee no longer has the need for alimony 
The trial court erred by not concluding that Appellee no 
longer has the need for alimony. The purpose of alimony is to 
enable the receiving spouse to maintain a standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent her from becoming a 
public charge. Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 76 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). Appellant's evidence and Appellee's testimony showed that 
Appellee's monthly expenses are reduced substantially because 
Appellee pays only one third of the mortgage payment, only one 
third of the household utilities, and only one third of the 
household expenses, based on Appellee's two adult sons living with 
her and paying their fair share of expenses. Evidence also showed 
that Appellee has no debt except for a small mortgage on her 
primary residence. Appellee has land in Lewiston, Utah worth 
$15,000.00 which, by her choice, is unproductive. Appellee's 
monthly income is $865.00. Appellee testified that she makes 
$5.50 per hour and if she were to work 40 hours per week, she 
would make $950.00 per month. Appellee then testified that her 
total actual monthly expenses, including food and taxes, are 
$545.52 Appellee has actual excess income of more than $300.00 
per month, and then receives an additional $300.00 per month from 
Appellant. The trial court erred by not determining that Appellee 
no longer has a need for alimony. 
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B. The trial court erred by considering Appellant's current 
wife's income as a factor regarding Appellant's ability to 
pay 
1. Appellant's current wife's income cannot be considered 
for Appellant's ability to pay 
The trial court erred in considering Appellant's wife's 
income in determining whether Appellant has had a change in 
circumstances which would warrant a modification of alimony. 
Appellee presented no evidence of case law which supported the 
proposition that the Appellant's spouse's income can be used to 
determine Appellant's ability to provide support. Appellant's 
current spouse has her own circumstances and obligations with 
which she must deal, and has no legal obligation to support 
Appellee. The determination to include both Appellant's and his 
current spouse's income for purposes of alimony to Appellee was 
clearly against the law and should be remanded for the proper 
application of the legal test. 
2. Appellant and his wife do not have the ability to pay 
alimony 
Even if Appellant's spouse's income were properly considered, 
Appellant presented sufficient evidence to show that the two of 
them together had a reduction from Appellant's earlier income and 
no longer had the ability to pay the alimony. Appellant's Exhibit 
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and the total amount of their combined obligations. Appellant and 
his spouse still had a monthly negative cash flow of $135.31. The 
only relevance of Appellant's spouse's income for the modification 
was to show her contribution to Appellant's household expenses. 
The trial court's determination that Appellant had the ability to 
pay, even when his spouse's income was considered was clearly 
erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court clearly erred in awarding attorney fees to 
Appellee when she failed to carry her burden of proof as to the 
reasonableness and necessity thereof. The trial court committed 
further error by awarding additional fees to Appellee at oral 
argument when the trial court apparently agreed with Appellant 
that Appellee failed to carry her burden of proof. 
The trial court's finding that Appellant and his current 
spouse have annual income in excess of $75,000.00 is clearly 
erroneous and not supported by the evidence. Appellant earns $.14 
per mile driven and no more. Appellant is not reimbursed by his 
company for his personal expenses on the road. It was error for 
the trial court to conclude that those expenses are reimbursed. 
The trial court's finding that it was contemplated at the 
time of the Decree that Appellee would seek employment is not 
supported by the evidence in that there is no such statement in 
the Decree, and there was no evidence presented to the court to 
make such a finding. 
The trial court's failure to analyze the factors involved in 
an award of alimony was clearly erroneous. The trial court erred 
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by not finding that Appellant no longer has the ability to pay, 
that Appellee no longer has need for alimony, and that Appellee 
can now support herself. The trial court further erred by 
considering Appellant's current wife's income when determining 
Appellant's ability to pay. The trial court failed to consider 
the added expenses of the current spouse if he considered the 
added income. The trial court's failure to correctly consider 
income and expenses was erroneous. 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial 
court, strike the awards of attorney fees, and remand to the trial 
court for correct evidentiary findings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ V ^ d a y of September, 1995. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the <%<$ ciay of September, 1995, two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT 
were hand-delivered to : 
M. Byron Fisher, Esq. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT DESCRIPTION 
1. Trial court's ruling on Modification, 
October 5, 1994 
2. Attorney fees proffer, 
Modification hearing, October 5, 1994 
3. Transcript of Oral Argument, 
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Exhibit "1" Trial court's ruling on Modification October 5, 1994 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
^r* ^s ^r* ^* ^* 
VARNELL J . DOBSON 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
DOROTHY LYNENE DOBSON 
Defendant, 
Transcript of: 
Modification 
Hearing 
Case No. 894904084 
The above-entitled cause of action came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, 
a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the State 
of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Wednesday, October 5, 
1994, at 10:00 a.m. 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
GLEN M. RICHMAN 
Attorney at Law 
60 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
BYRON M. FISHER 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
one-fourth hours in preparation and presentation, 
although it has taken more than that time today than it 
was anticipated. My proffer is that my usual and 
regular, normal hourly billing rate, and as due for my 
client, is $850 in attorney's fees. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions to ask of 
Mr. Fisher? 
MR. RICHMAN: He hasn't taken the stand. I 
don't agree he ought to be awarded attorney's fees or 
they are reasonable. 
THE COURT: You want him to be sworn? 
MR. FISHER: I have made my proffer, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: I am just asking you if you want to 
question him, if you disagree with his proffer. 
MR. RICHMAN: If he were on the witness stand 
and sworn, I would ask questions. Since he is not, I am 
not going to ask questions. 
I don't have any quarrel with him having spent 
that much time. His hourly rate is probably reasonable. 
I don't think it is necessary or he is entitled to fees 
under this condition. 
THE COURT: One of the most significant factors 
that guides the Court in what it must do in this case is 
that this was a bargained-for-divorce. It was agreed to, 
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1 and once the parties agree to something it is difficult 
2 for the Court to undo what the parties do. And sometimes 
3 that results in harsh results, inequities, unfairness. 
4 Facial unfairness just looking at things, but this isn't 
5 that case. 
6 This case is one where the parties married on 
7 April 14, 1961. They bargained for their divorce on 
8 October 3, 1990. I don't remember much about it. I 
9 remember Mr. Cayias and Mr. Fisher coming into my 
10 chambers and I remember that issues were discussed. But 
11 generally the deal was put together by Mr. Fisher and Mr. 
12 Cayias, and there was exchange, I am sure, back and forth 
13 between the parties, and give and take, and the ultimate 
14 result of a tug back and forth and the final result was 
15 achieved. 
16 The Court can't rely on precedence on 
17 unpublished opinions, but lower courts take their 
18 instructions from the Appellate Court, and this is merely 
19 instructional on what the Appellate Court thinks may be 
20 fair. I have only been appealed once in an alimony case, 
21 but the case is Nichols vs. Nichols which there was an 
22 order reversing in part and affirming in part, a May 26, 
23 1989 decision signed by Judge Beck. He was joined by 
24 Judges Greenwood and Judge Croft. 
25 The man was employed at Kennecott Copper. 
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There were no findings so I simply relied on memory. It 
was the rejiggered Kennecott Copper when wages were much 
lower. As I recall, the man's wages were in the range of 
18,000 a year. The woman had two children. One was just 
at the age of majority. The other was still in or out of 
the home, and the other daughter was 16 or 17 years of 
age. She had a small modest home in Magna which she got. 
I heard a half a day's testimony from a medical doctor 
who testified for a whole half day with a litany, an 
unending litany of maladies as to why she was not 
employable. I cannot remember what the child support 
was. It would have been the guideline amount. I can't 
remember the amount of alimony, but it is a three-
sentence order. One sentence: "Based upon the evidence 
in the record and the Court's findings, appellant is 
hereby awarded alimony of $500 per month and child 
support for Rebecca at the rate of $200 per month." So 
my order after a trial was less than those amounts. 
So considering a 29-year marriage, at $300 a 
month alimony, bargained for, with a tax return for 1990 
demonstrating income of $49,761 for Mr. Dobson and on the 
other hand for Ms. Larsen, the representations to the 
Court then were zero. 
The financial declaration in the file dated 
March 26, 1990 showed $3776.24 income for Mr. Dobson. 
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Showed nothing for her. And the testimony the Court has 
heard is that she went to work in November of 1990. The 
decree was entered December 31, 1990, some two or three 
months, almost three months after the stipulation was 
entered between the parties. 
It was clear at that time and undisputable and 
was within the contemplation of the parties that Ms. 
Larsen was going to have to go back to work. She wasn't 
going to get by on $300 per month. She got a home in 
Lewiston, Utah, that wasn't inhabited then and still 
isn't inhabited, and she got a 1981 Cadillac. I don't 
recall that she got much else that was spendable or 
useable at all. It is obvious you couldn't get by on 
$300 per month. Currently she earns $5.50 per hour. She 
says she works 35 hours per week. She works a little 
more than that based upon a seven and a half months 
history and the Court finds that she earns reasonably 
$865 per month from her employment at O.P. Skaggs. 
On the other hand, Mr. Dobson worked for USPCI 
and during the years 1990 through termination of his 
employment, he earned in the range of $48,000 to $55,000 
year-in and year-out. He voluntarily terminated that 
employment, but did not, in the Court's mind, adversely 
affect his position, although the earnings that are 
attributable to him are somewhat less. 
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1 When you consider the combined earnings of he 
2 and his wife, they are not that shockingly different. He 
3 had gross earnings year-to-date of 9-30-94 having started 
4 his employment on February 11, 1994 of $13,565.10. He 
5 received expense advances of $5,693.60 and was reimbursed 
6 expenses of $8,553.08, leaving a net for his pocket of 
7 $2,859.48. Adding that to the $13,565.10, gives him 
8 gross income year-to-date September 30, 1994, of 
9 $16,424.58. In addition to that amount on that paycheck, 
10 he had mileage of 4,874 miles, at 4 cents a mile, 
11 yielding $194.96. And if you figure 4500, that still 
12 yields mileage per diem of $180. Applying that on a 
13 weekly basis and converting that to a monthly figure, 
14 means that he gets 800 to $840 per diem on a monthly 
15 basis, which yields monthly earnings to him in the range 
16 of $3,000 per month or $36,000 per year. 
17 His wife, going through the same analysis, has 
18 more earnings on hers and the difference is largely 
19 because she gets the same per diem he does. She gets 
20 some expense reimbursements without the large offsetting 
21 advance figure. On her year-to-date figure, she only had 
22 advances of 200 but received reimbursed expenses of 
23 $4,959.60, which yielded to her year-to-date income of 
24 $17,890.70, plus a monthly per diem of 800, $840 which 
25 would yield combined income of the two of them of $6,250 
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per month. On an annualized basis, $75,000 per year. 
For them to suggest she ought to make choices, 
going down her expenses, arguing with every $5 and $10 
and think the Court is not serious about taking a cooler 
onto your truck and start stopping at McDonald's and 
Wendy's and fixing your own snacks if you are going into 
debt, you have to make choices. And it is offensive to 
the Court that you think those choices ought to be 
whittled out of her $5 or $10 items for the sake of 
having a combined monthly, unreimbursed, non-taxed 
expense allowance of 360, $375 per month. 
There are not substantial and material changes 
of circumstances to justify a modification. The alimony 
shall remain at $300 per month. The plaintiff is awarded 
judgment for alimony arrearages of $2600, plus the 
general rate of interest which is allowable by law from 
the date those payments were due, plus $850 attorney's 
fees. 
Will you prepare appropriate Findings, 
Conclusions and Decree? 
MR. FISHER: I will. 
THE COURT: With respect to the issue on the 
$2500, that is covered. You have got a QDR0. You have 
got an award of it in the decree and if per chance those 
funds were taken and wrongfully disbursed by the trustee, 
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Exhibit "2" Attorney fees proffer 
Modification hearing October 5, 1994 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT-
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
^s ^p p^. ^s ^n 
VARNELL J. DOBSON 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOROTHY LYNENE DOBSON 
Defendant, 
Transcript of: 
Modification 
Hearing 
Case No. 894904084 
* # * * * 
The above-entitled cause of action came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, 
a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the State 
of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Wednesday, October 5, 
1994, at 10:00 a.m. 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
GLEN M. RICHMAN 
Attorney at Law 
60 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
BYRON M. FISHER 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
anyone else's living expenses, except the recipient's 
when you are looking at her expenses. And it also cites 
a case of Willy vs. Willy. It doesn't matter if they are 
step children, adult children or grand children. It is 
her expenses that we care about. Although it was 
laborious to do so and it almost sounds picky, we went 
through the financial declaration and cleared some of 
those things up that have been falsely put before this 
Court, or inaccurately put before this Court. 
I would suggest that the Court ought to make an 
order that would be effective in modifying the decree by 
terminating alimony; effective as of the date we filed 
this petition. And I think to do otherwise merely puts 
this man in a continuing posture where he cannot perform 
and then is made out as a bad guy. He is not a bad guy. 
He sat on the witness stand and told the Court the truth 
about his circumstances and he is a very straightforward 
person, hard worker. It is preposterous to think that he 
is intentionally earning less money with very long and 
hard hours to avoid paying $300. I just can't buy that, 
Your Honor. Thank you. 
MR. FISHER: I did not proffer any attorney's 
fees and I think for the record I need to do that. 
THE COURT: You may do so. 
MR. FISHER: Thank you. I have spent six and 
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one-fourth hours in preparation and presentation, 
although it has taken more than that time today than it 
was anticipated. My proffer is that my usual and 
regular, normal hourly billing rate, and as due for my 
client, is $850 in attorney's fees. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions to ask of 
Mr. Fisher? 
MR. RICHMAN: He hasn't taken the stand. I 
don't agree he ought to be awarded attorney's fees or 
they are reasonable. 
THE COURT: You want him to be sworn? 
MR. FISHER: I have made my proffer, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: I am just asking you if you want to 
question him, if you disagree with his proffer. 
MR. RICHMAN: If he were on the witness stand 
and sworn, I would ask questions. Since he is not, I am 
not going to ask questions. 
I don't have any quarrel with him having spent 
that much time. His hourly rate is probably reasonable. 
I don't think it is necessary or he is entitled to fees 
under this condition. 
THE COURT: One of the most significant factors 
that guides the Court in what it must do in this case is 
that this was a bargained-for-divorce. It was agreed to, 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
VARNELL J. DOBSON, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DOROTHY LYNENE LARSON 
(DOBSON), 
Defendant. 
S^2r 
Case No. 894904084 DA 
BENCH DECISION, 1-30-95 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 30th day 
of January, 1995, at 10:00 o'clock a.m., this cause 
came on for hearing before the HONORABLE KENNETH 
RIGTRUP, District Court, without a jury in the Salt 
Lake County Courthouse, salt Lake City, Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: GLEN M. RICHMAN 
Attorney at Law 
For the Defendant: BYRON FISHER 
Attorney at Law 
CAT by: CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR 
1
 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: Let me just simply review 
3 briefly some of the considerations I had in mind: 
4 Reference was made in your pleadings, Mr* Richman, to 
5 the fact that there were findings made at the initial 
6 divorce. That is incorrect because the parties 
7 stipulated settlement on the record. And although 
8 there might have been discussion between Counsel and 
9 clients and even in the presence of the Court about 
10 Mrs. Dobson's health and her inability to work, there 
11 were no findings made thereon. 
12 This was a marriage of 29 years 
13 duration. And although were there were no findings 
14 about his income at the time of the divorce, I 
15 pointed out, I think, in my oral decision that there 
16 was a Financial Declaration indicating that he had 
17 $45,000 plus income during 1990 which was the year 
18 that the divorce took place. 
19 There was an exhibit offered by you 
20 Indicating a copy -- that there was a copy of his tax 
21 return showing that he had gross income in 1990 of 
22 near $50,000. 
23 Based upon her lack of employment and the 
24 award of $300 per month, there clearly were not any 
25 findings made about her health and inability to 
1 work. But it is obvious to anyone that it was 
2 reasonably within the contemplation of the parties 
3 that she'd have to go to work. She couldn't get by 
4 on $300 per month. 
5 The Court may have misinterpreted the pay 
6 stubs of Mr, Dobson and his current wife. And the 
7 order specifically reports that there was combined 
8 income of the two of over $75,000. Mr, Dobson is not 
9 here. By now he has W-2's for 1994 and any doubt 
10 could be removed. 
11 I've gone back and looked at the 
12 underlying documents and I've reviewed your Affidavit 
13 of Mr, -- what is it, Degarsio (phonetic) or 
14 something? 
15 MR. READING: Degrasio (phonetic), I 
16 believe, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT; -- close to that, and it's 
18 possible that I did misunderstand, but not very far* 
19 The mileage reflected on the pay stubs I 
20 had, both Mr. and Mrs. Dobson, reflected 4,874 miles 
21 for one week of driving. Assuming that's a fairly 
22 average week, assuming that they drive 50 years -- or 
23 50 weeks of the 52 and taking nine and a half cents 
24 per mile mileage plus four and a half percent -- four 
25 and a half cents for their reimbursement allowance or 
1 14 cents per driver, you — and doing those 
2 calculations, you come up with $68,250 on an 
3 annualized basis. 
4 MR, READING: For two people. 
5 THE COURT: For two people. 
6 There was a discrepancy between what was 
7 reported as expense to reimbursements and as 
8 advances, And without seeing the w-2 for the full 
9 year, the Court really could not reconcile it; 
10 though, my impression was that there was some 
11 advantage gained to both the Dobsons in getting some 
12 reimbursements for what they expended* But 1 would 
13 need the '94 W-2's to really size that up. 
14 But at minimum, going through the 
15 calculations that I did on my mileage, it's clear to 
16 me that they have income of at least $68,000 per year 
17 between the two of them, 
18 They didn't hire Mrs* Dobson because she 
19 was an experienced driver* The marketability of the 
20 team was principally because of Mr. Dobson* He was 
21 the experienced driver that had driven for many 
22 years, and he was the guy that knew the trucking 
23 business. she took the test and she got a 
24 chauffeur's license or a commercial license so that 
25 she could drive an 18-wheeler and be part of the 
1 team. 
2 The statements •- the two check stubs 
3 that you gave me demonstrated that the higher income 
4 was on April Dobson's statement more than 
5 Mr. Dobson's. That is not credible in view of their 
6 respective backgrounds and experience in terms of 
7 driving. 
8 So it is the Court's conclusion that it's 
9 reasonably inferable from that that more than half of 
10 the 68,000 is reasonably attributable to Mr. Dobson, 
11 Given a 29-year marriage and given the 
12 conservative estimate of alimony at $300 per month, 
13 the $35,000 income at least that he had and the 
14 income that she had at five dollars and fifty cents 
15 per hour or roughly 825 -- or $830 per month income, 
16 does not justify modification. 
17 There's still a large disparity in 
18 income. The choice to leave the subsidiary at Union 
19 Pacific was that of Mr. Dobson's, and his current 
20 situation were the choices of Mr. Dobson* The fact 
21 that she had an interest in a broken-down property in 
22 Smithfield, Utah, was a property division. Her 
23 acquisition of modest housing in Preston, Idaho, is 
24 within the reasonable contemplation of the parties. 
25 And the fact that she's taken up camp with two sons 
1 is some reasonable indication to the Court that they 
2 do that in their interest of -- self-interest of 
3 survival• 
4 And given all of those circumstances, the 
5 Court's decision to not modify was sound and 
6 sustainable on appeal, 
7 I think I gave you ample opportunity to 
8 grill Mr. Fisher to a fare-thee-well if you had 
9 desired to do so. And the starting of a business 
10 after that hearing is done with wild expectation, I'm 
11 sure, on the part of Mrs. Dobson and her son, but the 
12 proof of the pudding is down the line in terms of 
13 whether that's going to be productive. I suspect if 
14 she makes lot of money, then the Court's in a 
15 position certainly at that point to modify. 
16 $300 a month alimony, given the fact that 
17 Uncle Sam and the state tax collector pay 30, 35 
18 percent of that is still a very, very modest alimony 
19 award under all the circumstances. 
20 The motion for relief based upon newly 
21 discovered evidence is denied. 
22 The motion for a new trial is denied. 
23 And an additional $350 is awarded to 
24 Mr. Fisher for his rendering a defense herein. 
25 MR. FISHER; I will prepare that order, 
Your Honor- Thank you* 
THE COURT: If the 1994 W-2 reflects that 
the $75,000 is in error, then I suppose I would 
accept a late-filed exhibit and correct that one 
finding. But on an annualized basis, I suspect my 
analysis of the 60,000 on an annual basis as a 
roinimum threshold is still reasonably accurate. 
MR. FISCHER; Thank you, sir. 
THE COURT: We will be in recess. 
(Hearing adjourned.) 
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